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Faster than a speeding bullet: Geolocation data and account misuse

Today's global economy and mobile workforce have a large impact on modern network security, elevating the importance of a "defense in depth" approach. Geolocation information has become an important element to monitor as part of such a layered defense. Incorporating geolocation information into network security programs does not necessarily require additional expenditure if the appropriate resources (such as a SIEM) are already in place. By tracking the geographic location for account logins, it is possible to discover...

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Faster Than a Speeding Bullet: Using Geolocation to Track Account Misuse

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Abstract

Today's global economy and mobile workforce have a large impact on modern network security, elevating the importance of a "defense in depth" approach. Geolocation information has become an important element to monitor as part of such a layered defense. Incorporating geolocation information into network security programs does not necessarily require additional expenditure if the appropriate resources (such as a SIEM) are already in place. By tracking the geographic location for account logins, it is possible to discover anomalies by calculating the distance between two logins from the same account. If the speed required to travel that distance within the allotted time is unlikely or impossible, this can indicate account misuse. This use of geolocation data can augment other monitoring techniques to detect malicious behavior on a network. This paper explores how such calculations can be made, identifies parts of the process requiring special consideration, and highlights what can be revealed when using geolocation data to monitor account use.

1. Introduction

A well-established security program is based upon the principles of defense in depth with numerous types of controls in place throughout the network. Each of these systems provide alerts and logs notifying the security analyst of possible attacks or other incidents.

The problem then moves from acquiring evidence of attacks to sifting through the mountains of information flowing past analysts in such a way as to highlight the data of interest. The first step to making sense of all the information is to send it to a single collection spot, usually a device called a SIEM or Security Information and Event Manager. The real benefit of a SIEM is not just as an aggregator of log data - there is still far too much of it and far too much noise for any human to be able to make sense of it. A quality SIEM provides a framework to apply logic to all of that data. This is where correlation occurs and where the real value of log aggregation comes in.

A simple example of a SIEM correlation rule might be:

If these events occur in close proximity:

- *The mail gateway sees a zip attachment*
- *the host-based AV for the email recipient sends an alert for malware*
- *the proxy sees outbound connection attempts to known-bad destinations from that host*

then send an alert to the Security Operations Center to examine the host.

This rule describes a possible event (i.e. someone received and opened an infected email attachment and compromised their machine) by correlating between the logs from multiple sources and sending actionable alerts to the team which should handle the potential incident . This example is fairly straightforward as far as correlation rules go, but illustrates how a SIEM might be used to automate log correlation.

Content or rule generation for the SIEM therefore becomes of primary importance for a security program. All of the logs entering a SIEM represent large volumes of raw

data which can be refined into intelligence with the application of creativity and logic. The use of geolocation data described in this paper is one such refinement. The methodology described here is not intended to be revolutionary, but is an additional tool for the security toolbox, and one which can be created through the use of existing resources.

Geolocation information, the real-world location of an object, can be extracted from IP addresses in several different ways. The concept of using that information as part of “context aware security” (Gartner, n.d.) is simple to describe but some aspects can be complex to actually implement. A common way to make use of geolocation data is to look at the country level and determine if the network or company has any business communicating with the destination country. Using more granular data (down to the city level for example), additional possibilities open up. Common sense suggests that something strange is going on if a user logs in from one city and then 15 minutes later logs in from another city 3,000 miles away. Unless that user is endowed with superpowers (e.g. faster than a speeding bullet), they are unlikely to have traveled those 3,000 miles in the space of 15 minutes and this event becomes something worth looking into.

Targeted attacks against corporate or governmental networks often begin by compromising an end user’s computer. This is where malware is often installed and where most of the exploitation of vulnerabilities happens. In the “Cyber Kill Chain” model described by Lockheed Martin (Hutchins et al., 2011), most of the steps can occur on the end user workstation.



Figure 1 -Analysis of a successful intrusion, a.k.a. the cyber kill chain (Cloppert, 2010)

Ultimately, an attack against a network cycles through the kill chain more than once as interim goals are achieved - first gaining a foothold on a network, then maintaining persistence, finally locating and exfiltrating the data of interest. FireEye (Bu, 2014) illustrated the concept of looping through steps en route to the final goal with a similar diagram to the kill chain:




Figure 2 - The attack lifecycle (Bu, 2014)

The first interim goal of the initial activity is often to obtain the valid credentials of a user on the target network. The less malware used in the course of a compromise, the lower the risk an attacker runs of being detected. Valid credentials permit an attacker the opportunity to explore the network and find the targeted data - the looping steps in the attack lifecycle diagram - possibly without introducing additional malware. Without malware to cause alerts, or beaconing network traffic to a “command and control” location (C2 in the kill chain diagram above), a security team must fall back on behavioral analysis and context aware security.

Looking at geolocation data is one way to perform behavioral analysis. Geolocation information may provide a way to identify accounts which have been compromised and are being abused as part of an attack. It should be emphasized however, that this type of analysis is examining the “Actions” phase of the kill chain. Ideally, the kill chain would be disrupted much earlier in the process, but if initial compromise has occurred, behavioral analysis can disrupt the next cycle through the kill chain as the attack progresses towards its ultimate goal.

The concept of geolocation analysis to find account misuse is relatively simple to describe but the implementation can be complex. Additionally, the events detected by this type of data can be indicative of other forms of account misuse, besides that of compromise, as will be discussed below.

The geolocation analysis occurs across three separate phases:

- Phase 1, Calculation - remote access logs are parsed and data is looked up in the geolocation database to retrieve a location and timestamp
- Phase 2, Login Comparison - the raw data output from Phase 1 is compared to derive geographic distance between logins and speed required to traverse that distance
- Phase 3, Presentation - the output of the calculations is formatted and presented in dashboard format for human review

Each phase is discussed below, reviewing the context around the phase as well as any prerequisite data required. Then we examine the actual implementation within our example SIEM, Splunk.

2. Input data

When preparing to compare account login locations and calculate whether it is feasible for the user to have traveled between two points in the time between logins, a variety of source data is required. They can be summarized as:

- Remote access logs (VPN logs which include source IP and login time are the example used in this paper)
- Geolocation database
- Exclusion IPs

2.1 Remote access logs

Little needs to be said about the contents of the VPN logs, as the required data is simple enough - a login IP and time, though additional information is often contained in this type of log. The login IP should be a public IP address from which the remote user is connecting. The timestamp must follow the same corollaries applied to log aggregation in

general, i.e. the time should be synchronized across the network and is probably most easily handled if kept in UTC (i.e. Coordinated Universal Time, the main time standard) to avoid time zone conversion errors. The importance of synchronized time cannot be overstated. When tracking incidents and attempting to correlate events, as well as when performing the geolocation analysis described here, piecing together the correct picture relies on accurate timekeeping across disparate devices. The use of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a common method to address this need. The mechanics of running NTP or some other time correction mechanism across a network are outside the scope of this paper, but it is a foundational element to any SIEM solution in order to provide proper log correlation. Without synchronized time, the aggregated logs in a SIEM become a messy hash of events that are out of order and need to be manually reassembled.

2.2 Geolocation database

The geolocation database bears some additional explanation. Geolocation can be determined from an IP address in a number of ways, depending upon available time, money, and desired granularity. Probably the most common and most coarse method of deriving some geolocation information from an IP address is by looking it up in a WHOIS database and using the address of the registrar. As one might imagine, this leads to rough results, depending upon the nature of the owner of the IP address. IP registration data for a fairly small company might yield reasonably accurate information - almost certainly the correct country, probably the correct state (if in the U.S), possibly the correct city. However, a company the size of Google for example, which owns many IP addresses, yields only limited value for geolocation purposes from the WHOIS information. All of Google's IP addresses would appear to be coming from Mountain View, California, though Google clearly has many assets outside of Mountain View or California or even the United States. A malicious registrant could even falsify the registered address, sowing confusion and misinformation into the process.

What WHOIS lacks in detail, it makes up for in simplicity. For finer granularity of resolution, more complex methods of data mining and other methods are required.

These include using traceroute and Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing tables to determine the routing path and known location of backbone routers (Guo et al., 2009) (Padmanabhan et al., 2001). It is also possible to analyze delay-based information, which looks at the delay in connectivity between connections to IP addresses and attempts to deduce geographic distance information from that delay (Wang et al., 2011). The Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C) has even jumped into the game, offering a geolocation API to provide a standardized interface to gather geolocation data from client-side information.

The upshot of all of this is that getting accurate geolocation data is challenging and painstaking work, gathering crumbs together until they can be assembled into a loaf of bread so to speak. It is for this reason that many commercial services surrounding geolocation data have sprung up, providing access to their database of gathered crumbs. Among the several options for commercial geolocation information, IP2Location (<http://www.ip2location.com>) and Maxmind (<http://www.maxmind.com>) are examples of current leaders in the space. For the purposes of this paper, we will look at Maxmind. Maxmind offers a free database which provides limited detail as well as a commercial version which is more granular and frequently updated. The Maxmind FAQ has this to say about the accuracy of the data:

“MaxMind tests the accuracy of the GeoIP Databases on a periodic basis. In our recent tests, the GeoIP databases tested at 99.8% accurate on a country level, 90% accurate on a state level in the US, and 83% accurate for cities in the US within a 40 kilometer radius.” (Maxmind, n.d.)

MaxMind also provides an accuracy web page which allows one to select different levels of granularity to see the impact on accuracy across various countries (<https://www.maxmind.com/en/geop2-city-accuracy>). Regardless if the geolocation information is a rough approximation or very fine-grained, any conclusions about account misuse are absolutely reliant upon the completeness and accuracy of the data.

2.3 Exclusion lists

The other data set needed for accurate analysis is a list of IP addresses to be excluded from the calculation. There are several reasons that an IP address might need to be excluded from the geolocation calculation, but the most common has to do with internet points-of-presence or gateways. The way that many large organizations design their networks is to funnel all traffic out through specific gateways.

For example, consider a hotel chain. There are numerous different geographic locations for hotels that are part of a chain, and each hotel has an IT infrastructure which needs to be maintained, secured, and monitored. Duplicating all of the IT infrastructure and security controls across hundreds or thousands of locations could be cost prohibitive and an administrative nightmare to make sure that settings were consistent everywhere. Instead, it might be much more efficient to funnel all internet traffic back to a small number of gateways. Therefore the hotel in Reno, Nevada might be sending all of its internet traffic back to corporate headquarters in, for example, Los Angeles, California. So might all the other branches in Nevada, California, Utah, and Arizona. This allows the IT and security departments to maintain centralized equipment at the corporate headquarters, at the cost of probably unnoticeable latency increases for the hotel branch user.

This is relevant to the discussion of geolocation because now any guest using the WiFi offered by any branch of the hotel will appear to be having their traffic originate in Los Angeles. This impacts the geolocation analysis significantly, rendering it all but useless. A user might connect to the VPN from an IP which has valid geolocation data - a small coffee shop in Salt Lake City for example - and then walk across the street and check-in to the hotel and connect to the VPN from there. From our log analysis perspective, it will appear that the user traveled from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles in a few minutes, causing a false positive alert. Therefore networks with known architecture along these lines must be part in the list of IP addresses to be excluded in order to reduce false positives. Unfortunately, this also opens a large hole in the geolocation analysis. Any malicious activity or account misuse which takes place within the exclusion list

networks will be ignored, leading to false negatives. There is not an existing good solution to this conundrum, it is merely a flaw which should be understood before relying upon these data. Almost all processes have flaws and assumptions, but that fact alone does not mean that they need to be discarded. Rather, it is most important to understand the shortcomings so as not to overstate the completeness of the results.

2.4 Phase 1, Calculation

With the input data in hand, it is possible to perform the first step in the analysis. The VPN login information may well need to be de-duplicated, depending upon how the VPN devices output the log data. Then the login IP addresses can be scrubbed against an entry in the exclusion list. The scrubbed list of IP addresses can then be looked up in the geolocation database and, finally, yield a login time, IP address, and geographic location. This data will then be used in the next steps. The first phase of calculation is visualized in the figure below.




Figure 3 - Logic flow to get geolocation data for VPN logins

2.5 Phase 1, Implementation

Now that the required input data has been explored and the general flow of data through first stage of analysis described, it is valuable to provide a technical example of how to implement the concepts. For the purposes of an example, the SIEM used will be Splunk (www.splunk.com). Splunk offers a community version of the software which

provides full functionality but is limited on the amount of data which can be consumed daily. Between the free version of Splunk and the free version of the Maxmind database, the curious reader need only supply example VPN logs to be able to explore this technique in a lab. Exclusion lists will need to be generated on a case-by-case basis depending upon the nature and location of VPN traffic.

Thanks and acknowledgements go to Richard Gonzalez, a peer and friend in the security industry who worked out (and agreed to share) the Splunk queries used to put the geolocation analysis technique into practice (R. Gonzalez, personal communication, September 3, 2014). The queries themselves get a bit complicated and though some attempt will be made to describe the working parts, a deep explanation of how Splunk works is outside the scope of this paper. Please note that part of implementing Splunk involves naming data fields, sources, indices, etc. The flow of data through the Splunk queries discussed is the important component and any specific naming conventions may be changed as desired.

The Splunk query which matches the visualization diagram in Figure 3 is as follows:

```
index=vpn NOT [|inputcsv public_exclusions_cidr.csv |
fields Public_IP] Public_IP=* | eval
username=upper(username) |dedup username, Public_IP,
Machine_Name | rename Public_IP as clientip| lookup
geoip | rename clientip as Public_IP| eval
client_city=coalesce(client_city, "Unknown") | eval
client_country=coalesce(client_country, "Unknown") | eval
client_region=coalesce(client_region, "Unknown") | eval
formattedTime = strftime(_time, "%D %r") | table
formattedTime,username,vpn_manager, Public_IP,
Machine_Name, client_city, client_region,
client_country, client_lat, client_lon
```

The breakdown is as follows:

- `index=vpn NOT [|inputcsv public_exclusions_cidr.csv | fields Public_IP]` - this specifies the vpn logs which have been sent to

splunk and removes any IP addresses which match the exclusions listed in “public_exclusions_cidr.csv”

- `Public_IP=* | eval username=upper(username) | dedup username, Public_IP, Machine_Name` - performs some formatting to make data easier to manipulate and then de-duplicates the VPN entries
- `rename Public_IP as clientip | lookup geoip | rename clientip as Public_IP` - this portion of the query is passing the data to the Maxmind Splunk app (<https://apps.splunk.com/app/291/>) and looking up the geolocation data for each “Public_IP” object (renamed to clientip for the Maxmind app)
- `eval client_city=coalesce(client_city, “Unknown”) | eval client_country=coalesce(client_country, “Unknown”) | eval client_region=coalesce(client_region, “Unknown”) | eval formattedTime = strftime(_time, “%D %r”) | table formattedTime, username, vpn_manager, Public_IP, Machine_Name, client_city, client_region, client_country, client_lat, client_lon` - First, this section populates all the fields which had no data return from the geolocation database with the term “Unknown.” Then some formatting occurs to provide the data in neat tabular form in preparation for the next phase of analysis.

3. Phase 2, Login comparison

The first phase of geolocation analysis has provided a summary table of data correlating usernames, IP addresses, geographic location, machine name, and time of login. To complete the analysis we need to monitor this table for a specified period of time looking for duplicate username entries and calculating the speed required to cover the distance between the two locations within the allotted time. This seems relatively simple, though there are some important details to factor in.

The first is the fact that the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line when one lives on the surface of a sphere. Maps of the Earth are projections of a three-dimensional object onto a two-dimensional surface. This results in some distortions

to which we have collectively grown accustomed. Those distortions mean that measuring the distance between two cities on a map with a ruler (i.e. a straight line distance) will not yield an accurate distance. The diagram below illustrates the fact that the straight red line is clearly not the distance a person would be required to travel to get from point A to B, unless they were to tunnel through the Earth. The arc between A and B is also known as an orthodromic distance, or great circle distance.




Figure 4 - The black line is the shortest distance between two points on a sphere - a “great circle” or orthodromic distance

Orthodromic distances are calculated frequently by aviators and mariners, or at least by their navigation devices, to provide the shortest path to a destination. To maintain reasonable accuracy in our distance calculations, we need to calculate the orthodromic distance between VPN login locations. This calculation uses spherical trigonometry and can appear a bit dense to pull apart:

$$\mathbf{a} = \sin^2(\Delta\phi/2) + \cos \phi_1 \cdot \cos \phi_2 \cdot \sin^2(\Delta\lambda/2)$$

$$\mathbf{c} = 2 \cdot \text{atan2}(\sqrt{\mathbf{a}}, \sqrt{1-\mathbf{a}})$$

$$\mathbf{d} = R \cdot \mathbf{c}$$

Figure 4 - The haversine equation, where ϕ is latitude, λ is longitude, and R is earth’s radius (mean radius = 6,371km) (Verness, n.d.)

Happily, we work in the world of computers where such equations can be handled simply and easily, so the details of spherical trigonometry will be left for another time. Our example SIEM, Splunk, has an app called “haversine” which is designed to perform just this calculation (<https://apps.splunk.com/app/936/#/overview>). It is nevertheless worthwhile to have some understanding of exactly what is happening when stepping through geolocation analysis. Understanding of the foundation helps to troubleshoot problems with the data and interpret the results more accurately. Essentially all of that spherical trigonometry boils down finding the length of a side of a triangle where that side is a curve (e.g. the surface of the earth).




Figure 5 - trigonometry helps to solve for ‘c’ in a standard triangle (right), the haversine formula uses spherical trigonometry to solve for ‘c’ when it is an arc (left)

3.1 Phase 2, Implementation

The Phase 1 calculation populated a “summary index” in Splunk which is a method that Splunk provides for storing computationally intensive data. Summary indices allow for quick data retrieval and use in subsequent calculations. Some of the technical details about using Splunk, such as how to save data to a summary index, are not in scope for this paper. Suffice it to say that the data from Phase 1 is being stored in a summary

index which, for clarity, has been named “IP mapping - Public IP to username with location” in the Splunk query for Phase 2.

Now that we have our geolocation and login time from Phase 1 and the capability to calculate the distance between two login locations via the haversine formula, we can convert that distance into speed by dividing the distance by the time. That is all done with the following Splunk query:

```
index=ip* source="IP mapping - Public IP to username with location" Machine_Name=* |dedup username, Public_IP, Machine_Name| eval location=client_city.", ".client_region.", ".client_country.", ".Public_IP.", ".Machine_Name| strcat client_lat ", " client_lon latlon |stats last(latlon) as latlon2, first(latlon) as latlon1, last(location) as location2, first(location) as location1, first(Machine_Name) as Machine1, last(Machine_Name) as Machine2,first(search_now) as time1, last(search_now) as time2,dc(latlon) as distinctCount by username | where distinctCount = 2 |haversine units=mi originField=latlon1 latlon2|eval time_diff=((time1-time2)/60)/60|eval speed=distance/time_diff |where Machine1!=Machine2 |sort distance desc
```

As before, here is the breakdown:

- `index=ip* source="IP mapping - Public IP to username with location" Machine_Name=*` - This portion of the query is pulling the data from the phase 1 summary index and only returning entries which have a `Machine_Name` field that is populated (the “`Machine_Name=*`” portion will exclude blank entries).
- `dedup username, Public_IP, Machine_Name` - A quick deduplication of data entries
- `eval location=client_city.", ".client_region.", ".client_country.", ".Public_IP.", ".Machine_Name` - this section creates a new field entitled “location” which is the collection of city, region (state), country, public IP, and machine name data.

- `strcat client_lat "," client_lon latlon` - the `strcat` function concatenates string values (Splunk, n.d), in this case connecting the user latitude and longitude together as a single variable 'latlon' which is how the haversine app requires input to be formulated
- `stats last(latlon) as latlon2, first(latlon) as latlon1, last(location) as location2, first(location) as location1, first(Machine_Name) as Machine1, last(Machine_Name) as Machine2, first(search_now) as time1, last(search_now) as time2,` - this section is moving data around and renaming it for ease of comparison later. This section takes the first and last occurrence of various data points (latlon, machine name, etc.) and renames them with distinct names (e.g. latlon1 and latlon2).
- `dc(latlon) as distinctCount by username | where distinctCount = 2` - in terms of the phrasing in the query, the 'dc(latlon) as distinctCount by username' section was actually part of the previous 'stats' section. However it seemed to make more sense to discuss all the distinct count manipulation together. This portion of the query is looking for the number of occurrences (distinct count) of latlon fields per username and then selecting those that occur two times ('where distinctCount = 2') in preparation for the next section.
- `haversine units=mi originField=latlon1 latlon2` - This short section is where the haversine formula is actually calculated using the haversine app available for Splunk (<https://apps.splunk.com/app/936/#/documentation>). We are specifying the units to be miles. As previously mentioned, the haversine app requires the latitude and longitude to be formatted in a specific fashion, which was done in the `strcat` section above.
- `eval time_diff=((time1-time2)/60)/60|eval speed=distance/time_diff` - Here we're calculating how much time passed between logins and then using that to calculate the speed required to traverse the distance in the specified time

- `where Machine1!=Machine2` - In an attempt to reduce false positives stemming from artifacts of network architecture (e.g. the discussion on internet gateways above), we have chosen to ignore any events where the name of the machine is the same for each entry. Instead we are only looking at events with different machine names but the same username.
- `sort distance desc` - A sort of the output in preparation for the next phase of calculations

All of that data manipulation has a few caveats and assumptions which are worth calling out. First of all, we are only examining events with a distinct count of 2. This means that if a user's credentials appear in the data more than twice within the polling period, it is ignored. This was done to minimize the complexity of an already complex query process. Looking for occurrences of 3 or more login events and comparing them all was deemed to be unnecessary with a short enough polling period. Accordingly, the polling period (which is actually the Phase 1 query) is set to occur every 15 minutes. Also, as mentioned above, we have chosen to discard events which occur where the machine name is constant. This was done to reduce false positives, but could possibly be leveraged as a way to avoid detection by an astute attacker.

4. Phase 3, Presentation of Results

We finally have all of the data required - the geolocation and time of VPN logins, the distance and time between each login from the same username, and the speed required to travel that distance within the time allotted. We now need to define when an event requires an investigation and to display the data in a human-readable and usable format. Here is a summary of the various thresholds/timing used in the course of these calculations:

Calculation	Threshold/Timing
Phase 1 query	Runs every 15 minutes
Phase 2 query	Runs once per hour examining previous 24 hours

Phase 3 query	Runs when dashboard is invoked
Distinct count of VPN login events per 15 minutes	2
Max speed before alert	800 mph

Table 1 - various timing choices and thresholds defined to streamline the functionality of data flow through the various queries

The threshold for speed, above which is considered to be an event worth investigation, is an arbitrary value. Commercial airlines typically travel at speeds below the speed of sound (Mach 1). Mach 1 varies based upon environmental conditions, but an average value is approximately 760 mph (Benson, 2014). Therefore a value of 800 mph was selected both for the fact that it is a round number and to allow for some margin of error in the calculations. Under normal conditions, VPN users do not typically exceed the speed of sound.

Here then is the final query used to populate the dashboard. As with Phase 1, the Phase 2 data is stored in a summary index in this case named “Multi-machine VPN logins - location and speed - daily.”

```
index=ip* daysago=2 source="Multi-machine VPN logins -
location and speed - daily" | dedup username, location1,
location2 | convert ctime(time1) as second_time |
convert ctime(time2) as first_time | rename location1 as
second | rename location2 as first | table username,
first_time,second, second_time,first, time_diff, speed |
where speed > 800 | sort speed desc | search NOT
first=*unknown* | search NOT second=*unknown*
```

Here is the breakdown:

- `index=ip* daysago=2 source="Multi-machine VPN logins - location and speed - daily"` - pulls the Phase 2 summary index data for the previous two days
- `dedup username, location1, location2` - data deduplication

- `convert ctime(time1) as second_time | convert ctime(time2) as first_time` - the Phase 2 query invoked a function “search_now” which returns time values in Unix epoch time (the number of seconds since 00:00:00 January 1, 1970). This portion of the query converts from epoch time to a more human-readable and familiar format.
- `rename location1 as second | rename location2 as first | table username, first_time, second, second_time, first, time_diff, speed | where speed > 800 | sort speed desc` - there are several actions occurring here, but they are easier to consider as a whole. This section begins by renaming some values for more clarity in the table, it then creates the table with the username, times, travel time, and speed. Finally it selects any entries with a speed greater than 800 mph and sorts them by speed.
- `search NOT first=*unknown* | search NOT second=*unknown*` - Finally, any entries which have “unknown” in them are discarded. “Unknowns” arise from time to time due to bad lookup returns. They provide no useful data so they are discarded.

We have now correlated VPN login information and geolocation data to allow us to perform some account misuse detection. Here is an example of what the final dashboard might look like (split into two images for legibility):

	username ↕	first_time ↕	second ↕
1	George	10/03/2014 13:45:00.000	Saint George, ON, Canada, 190.11.136.28, george-laptop
2	Lakshmi	10/03/2014 08:00:00.000	Bangalore, 19, India, 61.47.22.158, loaner-laptop

	second_time ↕	first ↕	time_diff ↕	speed ↕
	10/03/2014 14:00:00.000	Miami, FL, United States, 74.132.237.142, evil-guy	0.250000	4827.49
	10/03/2014 08:15:00.000	Hyderabad, 02, India, 49.35.157.249, haxx0rs	0.250000	1236.87

Figure 6 - Example (fictional) entries from the final dashboard “Abnormal VPN activity” as displayed in Splunk

There are certainly other possibilities for dashboard output depending upon the creativity and available time of the creator. For example, the geographic location could

be plotted on a map to provide a simple visual method to evaluate the information. For simplicity's sake, the dashboard discussed here is kept to native Splunk output and only the essential information.

Originally the idea was to detect account misuse arising from compromised credentials. And indeed that will show up in the results, but use of this process also highlights another form of account misuse - credential sharing. Typically user accounts are a method of authenticating a specific person so that appropriate permissions can be applied to access the correct level of data. Therefore security policies often prohibit the sharing of user account credentials, as this defeats the whole point of authentication. Credential sharing in large network will be detected by this geolocation process, provided that the users are geographically distant enough from each other. This makes sense - credential sharing is just a voluntary form of account compromise - but it's worth noting because those types of events may be more likely in any given network than malicious account compromise. This is in part due to the fact that there are specific defenses to protect against account compromise, whereas there are fewer controls to prevent, prohibit, or detect credential sharing. A security team implementing this geolocation process should anticipate the addition of credential sharing incidents to the workload. Though not the original aim of the process, detection of credential sharing provides additional value to a security team looking to find unusual activity and enforce security policies.

5. Conclusion

Correlating VPN login information with geographic location is the type of correlation that a SIEM is designed to do and can be implemented with little to no additional capital/operational expense. By using a geolocation database from a commercial provider, a SIEM can determine the location of a VPN login from the source IP address. The SIEM can then monitor recent VPN logins looking for logins with the same username from disparate locations and machines. The haversine formula allows for the calculation of the distance between two points of latitude and longitude, and from this

information one can calculate the speed required to travel that distance in the time between logins. Excessive or impossible speeds may be indicative of account misuse.

Ultimately, there are 3 general types of events which appear as the final product of the application of geolocation data to VPN logs.

- Compromised accounts
- Credential sharing (either policy violations or possibly the result of helpdesk involvement)
- False positives

False positives may be reduced with upfront time and effort spent investigating source IPs involved. In many cases, this is an artifact of network design involving internet gateways, and those source IP addresses may be added to an exclusion list. Detecting compromised user accounts or inappropriate credential sharing are both beneficial results from this use of SIEM correlation capabilities. Credential sharing is often against security policy, however credential sharing can be difficult to detect and therefore difficult to enforce. Without proper enforcement, a security policy becomes only a set of security suggestions.

Overall, the strengthening of security policy, as well as the detection of account misuse are well worth the effort required to implement this technically challenging but simple to describe concept.

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